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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NANCY JANE PEART ROCHE, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
MELVIN KENT ROCHE, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 15806 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a denial of a Motion to Amend 
the Decree of Divorce which motion was made two years after 
the Decree was granted. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Amend the Decree of 
Divorce was denied with prejudice in the First Judicial 
District Court of Box Elder County by the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, Judge. The Motion to Amend s::>ught to relieve 
Defendant-Appellant of child support payments ordered by the 
Decree granted April 9, 1975; the Motion to Amend was dated 
September 24, 1977. The Court ruled that the proper procedure 
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to consider new evidence at such late d3te after the Decree 
had been granted was to bring a new action rather than to fi~ 
a Motion to vacate the Decree as to paternity. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant states in his brief to this court the 
relief he seeks on appeal. He asks for a reversal of the lower 
court's denial of his motion to amend the Decree of Divorce, 
which motion he based on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
60(b}, and an application for a writ of Coram Nobis. The 
proper relief to seek from this court is a ruling that the 
lower court abused its discretion or acted contrary to law 
in requiring Appellant-Defendant to bring his request for 
partial relief by reasons of an independent action rather than 
by means of a Motion in the original action. Such relief 
sought on appeal would be directly responsive to the trial 
court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent, re reinafter referred to as the 
Respondent, adopts the facts substantially in the form as 
set out in Defendant-Appellant's brief, hereinafter referred to 
as Appellant, in as far as the facts are revealed, but Appellant 
fails to outline the facts concerning procedural actions which 
were taken and thus confuses the issue which is now before 
this court. The additional necessary facts'follow. 
The Decree of Divorce was granted April 9, 1975 (R-33) 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
between Appellant and Respondent with provisions for child 
support and rights of visitation. on April 4, 1977, Appellant 
made a motion in the lower court to vacate the Decree of 
Divorce as to paternity and to obtain relief from child support 
payments upon the discovery of new evidence which showed that 
he was not the biological father of the child (R-66). Appellant 
attached an application for a Writ of Coram Nobis to this 
motion, though he did not file, pay filing fees, nor meet the stat-
utory requirements for issuance and service of process involved 
with an independent action. 
The court, in a Memorandum Decision dated February 17, 1978, 
ruled against Appellant's Motion upon the finding that the case 
was directly controlled by McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 
494 P.2d 283 (1972) and Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 
949 (1959), (R-99). Appellant argued in his Motion for Recon-
sideration dated January 30, 1978, that upon the theory of the 
Writ of Coram Nobis and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
60(b), the court should have granted his motion and that the 
recent case of Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704 (1977), mandates 
the granting of his motion (R-102). The trial court, in a 
Memorandum Decision dated March 16, 1978, ruled against 
such Motion to Reconsider (R-114). 
The additional facts are necessary to clarify that the reason 
"the Court denied the setting aside of the order of payment 
of child support" (last paragraph of Appellant's brief, p. 5) 
is that the court found upon the rulings of Shaw, McGavin 
and~, supra, that the prq:Er method of obtaining partial 
-3-
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relief from the Divorce Decree is to bring an independent 
action; a Motion to Amend the original Divorce Decree is 
inadequate. The record discloses that from beginning to end 
all documents filed are filed in Civil No. 12730. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT THE MOTION TO AMEND THE DIVORCE DECREE 
AND THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT A NEW, 
INDEPENDENT ACTION WAS THE PROPER AVENUE 
FOR OBTAINING RELIEF. 
A. Appellant's Motion did not meet the requirements of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) because the Motion 
for Amendment came more than three months after Judgment had 
been entered. 
Rule 60(b) endows the trial court witn considerable 
authority to ensure justice by allowing the trial court to 
grant a motion to obtain relief from a Judgment if the motion 
is based upon certain theories and if the motion is timely. 
The facts of the case here may fall within one or more of 
three possible theories which could be the basis for Appellant's 
motion for relief: Mistake, newly discovered evidence, or 
fraud. Other theories upon which a motion for relief can be 
grounded are lis~ed and in his pleadings, appellant does 
assert that his case falls within the catch-all of reason (7) • 
"any other reason justifying relief" • Despite that assertion, 
he clearly argues and attempts to prove his cause on the 
basis of either mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud, 
-4-
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-but those three theories all require that a Motion for relief 
must be brought within three months of the entry of Judgment; 
Appellant's Motion to Amend the Divorce Decree was brought 
two years after the Decree of Divorce had been entered. 
(Appellant's cause does not qualify for a Rule 60(b) motion 
for relief, by a reading of the language of the Rule.) 
The Rule clarifies that it does not limit the power of 
a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a pnrty 
from a Judgment. Appellant's Argument, Point I, confuses the 
issues and argues that the trial court erred in not makjrg a 
finding of fact that the child was not his. The court does 
specifically recognize that fact, but, in following the mandate 
of Rule 60(b), it holds that relief from the Decree of Divorce 
should come by way of a separate action and not as a Rule 60(b), 
(1), (2), or (3) motion. 
B. The Trial court did not misconstrue case law as :i1: 
has developed in Shaw v. Pilcher, McGavin v. McGavin and Egan v. 
Egan, which cases required the trial court to hold as it did. 
Appellant relies heavily upon Egan v. Egan, supra. He 
argues that it controls this matter and displaces Shaw v. Pilcher, 
supra, and McGavin v. McGavin, supra, as controlling authority. 
In Shaw v. Pilcher, an ex-husband consented to the adoption of 
the child of his marriage by his ex-wife and her new husband. 
When the ex-husband found that the character of the new husband 
was questionable, he moved the court to grant relief in the 
original adoption matter by setting aside the adoption decree, 
alleging that the new husband and ex-wife had defrauded the 
-5 -
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court. This was seventeen months after the adoption decree 
was entered. The new husband argued that the proceeding 
for relief was in violation of Rule 60{b) because it fell 
outside the three month limitation period. This court then 
ruled at 950: 
A reading of the rule makes it apparent that a 
motion for relief based on the grounds enumerated 
therein is ineffective if made three months after the 
decision from which relief is sought. The proceeding 
here, although captioned a "Petition", was in fact 
a motion made in the original action, and was based 
primarily on an allegation of "fraud upon the court". 
we believe and hold that where "fraud upon the court" 
is the gravamen of the proceeding, such proceeding must 
be pursued in an independent action by filing a separate 
suit, paying the statutory filing fee therefore, {which 
was not done here) and requiring the statutory issuance 
and service of process. 
The attack here being based upon fraud upon the court, 
and having been leveled some seventeen months after 
the adoption decree, must have been pursued in an 
independent action, arrl not by way of motion in the 
original action. Otherwise, the rule would not make 
sense. 
The Shaw v. Pilcher reasoning was foun:l to directly 
control in McGavin v. McGavin, a 1972 case. There, upon 
facts substantially similar to those of the instant ca:;e 
the court ruled at 283 that the motion to set aside the 
divorce decree relating to custody of and support money for 
a child which was allegedly not the issue of the marriage, 
was improper because the motion was made 14 1/2 months after 
the divorce decree. 
such procedure did not comply with Rule 60{b), 
utah Rules of Civil Procedure, vo. 9, p. 662, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. The instant case is governed by the 
provisions of that rule as interpreted in the case of 
shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P. 2d 949 (1959) 
which is dispositive here. 
-6-
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Appellant's reliance upon Egan v. Egan is misplaced 
because Egan did not overrule or weaken Shaw or McGavin. 
rn reality, Egan strengthens the Shaw and McGavin line of 
reasoning. Egan holds on facts strikingly similar to the 
instant case that under Rule 60(b), the trial court may exercise 
its discretion to grant the relief necessary to do justice even 
though the action comes later than three months after the Decree 
is entered, if relief is sought by way of an independent action. 
The Supreme Cour~ in reaching this decision through the same 
trial judge who ruled in the instant case, strengthens the 
discretion cf the trial court to grant that relief which is neces-
sary to do Justice. Egan does not overrule Shaw and McGavin, but 
rather fills out case law interpretation of the meaning of Rule 
60(b). Shaw & McGavin hold that relief under Rule 60(b) may 
come from a motion made as part of the same proceedings if 
brought within three months of the entering of the Judgment. 
Egan illuminates another aspect of the rule: Nothing in Rule 
60(b) limits the rights of parties to obtain relief in an 
independent action brought outside the three-month limitation 
period. 
The case law required the trial court to disallow a motion 
brought as part of the same proceeding and not as a separate 
action when the motion came two years after the entry of Judgment. 
C. Appellant's Request for a writ of Coram Nobis was 
correctly refused, it being in fact a motion in the original 
action and not an independent action. 
Although there is some authority that a common-law Writ 
-7-
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of Coram Nobis may be considered to be in the nature of a new 
action, 18 Am.Jur2d, §31, Coram Nobis, the conduct of the 
Appellant in his pleadings and argument before the court 
rightly demonstrated to the trial court that the gravamen 
of the action was a motion made upon the mistake theory of 
Rule 60 (b) (1), the newly discovered evidence theory of Rule 
60(b) (2), or upon the fraud or misrepresentation theory of 
Rule 60 (b) (3), and not upon the Rule 60 (b) (7) catch-all 
provision. 
This conclusion is reasonable in light of the facts. 
Appellant's request for a writ of Coram Nobis first appeared 
on April 4, 1977 as an attachment to a motion in the original 
action which motion was to partially vacate the Decree of 
Divorce; and even though Appellant attempted to style his 
motion as an application for a Writ of Coram Nobis, it was 
in truth, a Rule 60(b) motion clothed in another label. This 
is apparent from Appellant's attempts to show by medical 
opinions and results of tests that newly discovered evidence 
did not justify the Judgment; this approach goes directly to 
the mistake and/or newly discovered evidence theories of the 
Rule. In addition, in his affidavit attached to the Motion to 
partially vacate the Decree of Divorce, Appellant states in 
paragraph 9 that he believes that the ex-wife's representatioos 
in the original Decree were false; this is argument which woo~ 
support the fraud theory of the Rule. 
The court's ruling that the application for the writ 
-8-
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was simply another motion, serves to preserve the integrity of 
the court system and the procedures by which it is governed. 
As in Shaw, Appellant here should be prevented from applying 
a label to his action in order to meet the requirements of the 
law (assuming arguendo that the Writ of Coram Nobis is a new 
action in this 'jurisdiction and exempt from the usual requirements 
of filing, fees, notice and service of process) while truly 
and as a matter of fact he argues a different theory for which 
he does not qualify. The requirement that Appellant style, 
plead and prove the same theory and the requirement that he 
must qualify under that theory are not mere technicalities; 
the requirements should be imposed to protect the integrity 
of the judicial system and provide regularity and stability 
upon which all may depend. This strong policy of the law is 
stated in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 
(1966). Though the facts of that case are not similar to the 
instant dispute, it was decided upon the same policy as should 
control in all contests of procedure. 
Even though the new rules of procedure had as a 
part of their purposes the removing of undue 
technicalities and rigidities in the law, and 
are to be liberally construed to effectuate 
justice, nevertheless, they were designed to 
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure 
which the parties and the courts could follow and 
rely upon. (Drury v. Lunceford, supra, at 663.) 
The trial court has ruled that Appellant may not obtain 
relief through an improper method and that he must make that 
attempt for relief by properly filing a new, independent action. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Such a requirement is uniformly imposed upon all WJ.o wish to 
avail themselves of the protection of the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 60 (b) requires that a party seeking to obtain relief 
from a Judgment upon the grounds of mistake, newly discovered 
evidence, or fraud must file his motion within three months 
of the entry of Judgment. Otherwise, relief must come through 
an independent action, which action must meet the usual requiu-
ments of filing and service of process. The gravamen of 
Appellant's request for relief relies upon theories which 
require that Appellant bring his motion for relief within the 
three-month limitations period. 
The trial court found that, though styled as an applicatwn 
for a Writ of Coram Nobis, the request for relief was in reality 
introduced as a motion to a prior proceeding and not as a 
new action, and that Appellant's conduct and efforts at trial 
were consistent with that reality. The Respondent prays that 
the trial court's Judgment be upheld and that Appellant be 
required to comply with proper rules of procedure. 
Respectfully submitted this _._O'--- day of November, 1978 
DALE M. DO 
Attorney for Respondent 
P. o. Box u 
29 south Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
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